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Article 1

FOREWORD

Two

SYMPOSIA: JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND CHRISTIAN REALISM

THOMAS

C.

BERG*

This issue of the Law Journal contains two sets of articles, covering a pair
of topics of great importance and cun'ent interest. The topics are quite different, and yet they have a significant point of contact between !bcm.
1.

The first set of articles deals with how to interpret the U.S. Constitution:
in particular whether the interpreter should examine only the Constitution's
original meaning as opposed to considering other inputs such as precedent,
traditions, or !be contemporary understandings of concepts like equality or
free speech found in the text. This debate persists not just among scholars
and judges, but also in the general public, because the polar opposite of a
court decision using proper methodology is one that is lawless, imposing
the judge's preference under cover of the Constitution. Nobody wants lawless decisions, even if people disagree on what the lawless decisions are.
The articles on constitutional interpretation revolve around !be lecture
On Not Being "Not an Originalist, "1 delivered by Professor H. Jefferson
Powell, one of !be nation's leading constitutional scholars. Professor Powell
argues that originalist methodology has virtues, especially in comparison
with Supreme Court decisions that have truly been lawless: "[Olriginalism
is an elegant response to a genuine problem."2 But ultimately, he says,
originalism is inadequate compared with a multi-factor approach that considers original meaning as "one among a much broader set of modalities of
interpretation" inclUding precedent, analogy, and moral and prudential con-

* St. Ives Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of St.
Thomas School of Law,
1. H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being "Not An Originalist," 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 259
(2010). As of August 1, 2010, Professor Powell wilJ be the Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at
George Washington University Law School. Pro:'essor Powell's is the second annual Law Journal
Lecture.
2. [d. at 269.
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siderations 3 In his own words, therefore, he is "neither an originalist nor
'not an originalist,' and in my view you too should avoid being either."·
While affirming that judges in constitutional cases should subject
themselves to the authority of the text, Professor Powell argues that such
discipline will come more from the traditional conventions of sound, responsible legal reasoning than from a "reductionistic" focus on historical
meaning. s The latter, he argues, will not eliminate "human waywardness
and error," because "inept or manipulative arguments can be made about
original meaning." Therefore,
[alll the pathologies anyone has ever seen in our original constitutional tradition . . . would assert themselves in the remade
originalist world, amplified by loss of the tradition's common law
concern with particularity, with justice in the individual case, and
by loss of the traditional recognition that uncertainty and disagreement are unavoidable .... The tradition, with all its flaws, is
grounded in the practicalities of responsible decision 6
In his responsive article in this issue, Professor Powell recognizes the
originalist critique that a notion of multi-factored "lawyer's craft" will not
guide justices sufficiently to distinguish law from their personal preferences 7 But, he answers, a theory of interpretation cannot and should not be
designed primarily to stop bad faith or lawlessness. Its point is "to enable
the decision maker acting in good faith to do her job better, more in accord
with the societal understanding of her office and its duties"-"somewhat as
the scientific method is a description of how to do science rather than a
(vain) attempt to stop dishonest experimenters from falsifying their data.'"
This formulation may not give enough weight to the need to have a constitutional theory that, even if it cannot stop judicial lawlessness, at least can
say clearly when it has happened. 9 But even at the end of his response,
Powell still reaffirms the importance of (courts) being modest. 1O
In other words, Professor Powell seeks an account of constitutional
adjudication that will recognize the limits on the Court's efficacy and com3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 273.
!d. at 259.
Id. at 280.
!d. at 278.
H. Jefferson Powell, Further Reflections on No' Being "Not an Originalisf, " 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 288, 307 (2010) (originalism "sees in traditional legal reasoning an inadequately
constraint on judicial wiltfulness"),
8. Id. at 308.
9. Indeed, in earlier work Professor Powell appeared more skeptical whether a meaningful
shared concept of lawyer'S craft exists in taday's polarized legal culture. See H. JEr"'FERSON PowELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOOICAL INTERPRETA.

6-7 (1993).
10. Powell, supra note 7, at 309 ("The law and the Court are limited in their efficacy and
competence, and there is ample reason to fcar that in recent years the Court has taken too little
note of those limits.").

TION

viii

petence but also "acknowledge the real achievements of our constitutional
tradition," which "is for all its flaws a vital part of the ongoing American
experiment in making governmental authority worthy of respect, and governmental power an instrnment of human good."ll Professor Robert Delahunty, in his reply to Powell, also seeks an account that grounds the
Court's legitimacy by identifying a real role it can play but also emphasizing its limits. 12 Professor Delahunty's answer emphasizes the legitimizing
principle of democracy, which the Court can playa "vital, in fact indispensable, role" in reinforcing by "eliminating structural flaws in the democratic
process" that the political branches will fail to confront. l3 In other words, if
the Court carries through the project of footnote four of Carolene Products,
it will have a role that will recognize both its possibilities and its limits.14

2.
The second set of articles in this issue stem from a November 2009
symposium on "Christian Realism in Public Life: Catholic and Protestant
Perspectives," sponsored by the University of St. Thomas's Terrence J.
Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy. The conference rested on the premises (I) that there is an important "impulse for
Christian theology," both Catholic and Protestant, "to be realistic-to be
based in a clear-headed assessment of facts about God, human beings, and
the world-... althongh the themes and the definitions of realism vary,"
and (2) that "[aln examination of 'realism' in religious and political thought
is timely" today. IS
The term "Christian realism" is associated mostly with theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr, who in the mid-20th-century set out an influential vision
of Christian action for justice in the world that also acknowledged the depth
of human sin and its barriers to idealist or perfectionist programs. 16 For
Niebuhr, a Christian account of human nature and politics meant that efforts
11. [d.
12. Robert I. Delahunty, Origil1aiism and Legitim.acy; A Reply to Professor Powell, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS LJ. 281 (2010). Professor Delahunty is an Associate Professor at the University of S1.
Thomas School of Law.
13. [d. at 285, 287.

14. Delahunty only suggests this as a direction, but the Carolene Products project has been
extensively mapped out in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980). Ely's discussion probably needs to be tweaked, as Delahunty implies, with the
complications introduced by analyses of the political process such as public choice theory. See
Delahunty, supra note 12, at 286-87.
15. Call for Papers, "Christian Realism and Public Life: Catholic and Protestant Perspecti ves, " http://www.stth a m as. ed ul cath studi es 1m urp hyin s ti tu tel conferen ces/R ealis mC all for
Papers.html.
16. See, e.g., ROBIN LoVIN, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND THE NEW REALITIES (2008); ROBIN
LOVIN, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND CHRISTIAN REALISM (1995); RICHARD WIGHTMAN Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY (1986); Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social
Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1567, 1582-96 (1995).
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to achieve justice must be pursued even though they always contain elements of moral ambiguity and pose risks of abuse:
We will not regard the pressures and counter pressures, the tensions, the overt and the covert conflicts by which justice is
achieved and maintained, as normative in an absolute sense; but
neither will we ease our conscience by seelang to escape from
involvement in them. We will know that we cannot purge ourselves of the sin and gnilt in which we are involved by the moral
ambiguities of politics without also disavowing responsibility for
the creative possibilities of justiceY
Niebuhr applied this approach to a host of moral-political issues over
several decades. But he exercised the greatest influence during the early
Cold War years, especially among anti-Communist liberals, by arguing that
Americans must resist the evil of Soviet totalitarianism but also guard that
in doing so they did not "ironically" take on the opponent's vices, from
relying excessively on military solutions to maldng arrogant claims of innocence to justify actions. 18
In the last decade, the new round of threats and challenges posed by
radical Islamic terrorism made Christian realism seem relevant again, both
as a spur to fight terrorism and as a critique of the Bush's administration's
perceived excesses!9 More broadly, President Barack Obama, in an interview with columnist David Brooks, called Niebuhr "one of [his] favorite
philosophers," who taught "the compelling idea that there's serions evil in
the world, and hardship and pain," "we should be humble and modest in our
belief we can eliminate those things," "[b]ut we shouldn't use that as an
excuse for cynicism and inaction. [Obama] take[s] away [from Niebuhr] the
sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naive idealism to bitter realism. "20
In this context, it seemed timely to reexamine Christian realism, but
with a distinctive perspective drawn from the Murphy Institute's mission to
"explor[e] the various interactions between law and Catholic thought on [a
range of] topics," "driven by a 'vision of the human person and the world
that is enlightened by the Gospel' (Pope John Paul II, Ex Corde Eccle-

17. REINHOLD
18.

NIEBUHR,

2 THE NATURE AND

OF MAN: HUMAN DESTINY 284 (1943).
(1952).
AGAINST TERROR (2003) (arguing that

DESTINY

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY

19. See, e.g.,

JEAN BETHKLE ELSHlAIN, JUST WAR

Niebuhrian realism supports vigorous action against terrorism); PETER BEINART, THE GOOD
FIGHT: WHY LIBERALs-AND ONL Y LIBERALS~CAN WIN THE WAR ON TERROR AND MAKE
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (2005) (arguing that Niebuhrian realism supports vigorous action but
with more emphasis on economic development in Muslim nations and strengthening America
domestically); ANDREW 1. BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POViER; THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTION.
ALlSM (2008) (arguing that Niebuhrian realism shows Amelican arrogance in prosecllting wars
and seeking to transform Middle East).
20. David Brooks. Op-Ed., Obama, Gospel and 1!erse, N.Y, TIMES, April 26, 2007, http://
selec t.ll yti mes. com/2007/041261 opinion126brooks .html ?_1'= 1,
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siae)."21 It turns out there are important similarities, although important differences too, between Niebuhrian realism and the rich tradition of Catholic
social thought on human nature, politics, and law."2 Pope Benedict XVI
himself has spoken at various times of a "Christian realism" that grounds
both the legitimacy of and limits on war and also supports a sober, patient
hope for Africans living in poverty.2 3 Although Benedict and Niebuhrians
may use "Christian realism" to refer to different ideas, their emphases overlap in that both see real hope in the world coming only from a sober assessment that emphasizes humans' sin as well as their God-given dignity and
possibilities-the paradoxical nature that Pascal called "the wretchedness of
a great lord, the wretchedness of a dispossessed king. "24
Other papers from the Catholic-Protestant dialogue over "Christian realism" will appear in other venues, but the Law Journal is publishing three
articles with direct implications for law and public policy. Professor Victor
Romero proposes an approach to immigration policy that enunciates "hope"
in the biblical commands to welcome the stranger, while confronting the
need for "humility" in seeking to make progress in a Congress and nation
inclined overall toward stricter enforcement of immigration restrictions. 25
While cautioning against letting hnmility significantly limit hope, Professor
Romero explores viable "immigrant-friendly alternatives focusing more on
integration than enforcement," "[fJrom reconfiguring the rhetoric of comprehensive immigration reform to mediating the role of states and
localities. "26
21. University of St. Thomas - Teuence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law and
Public Policy, http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/murphyinstitute/default.htmI.
22. For explorations of some of the similatities and differences, see Jeanne Heffeman, Acknowledging Ambiguity and Difference in Politics: A Christian Realist Challenge to Thomists, in
REASSESSING THE LIBERAL STATE: READlNG MARITAIN'S MAN AND THE STATE 87,96 (Timothy
Fuller and John P. Hittinger eds., 2001); Thomas C. Berg, John Courtney Murray and Reinhold
Niebuhr: Natural Law and Christian Realism, 4 1. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 3 (2007), http://
ssm.comiabstract=84 798 5.
23. See John L. Allen, Jr., Fall out from Benedict's conWlents on Islam; What's next jor
Christian-Muslim relations?, NAT. CATH. REF., Sept. 22, 2006, http://nationalcatholicreporter.org/
word/pfw092206.htm (quoting then-Cardinal Ratzinger as saying, "The pope has not proposed
[opposition to the Iraq war] as the doctrine of the Church, but as the appeal of a conscience
illuminated by the faith .... This is a position of Christian realism which, without dogmatism,
considers the facts of the situation, while focusing on the dignity of the human person as a value
worthy of great respect."); Interview of the Holy Father Benedict XVI During the Flight to Aftica
(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.vatican.va/holy jather/benedicCxvi/speechesI2009/march/
documentsIhCben-xvCspe_20090317 _africa-interview _en.html (stating that "Christian realism"
that "proclaims a God who became man, therefore a profoundly human God, a God who suffers,
also, with us, gives meaning to our own suffering through a proclamation with a broader horizon,
which has more future" than so-called "prosperity gospels").
24. BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 29 (1662) (AJ. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin 1995 ed.).
25. Victor C. Romero, Christian Realism and lTmnigration Rejonn, 7 U. ST. THOMAS LJ.
310, 311-12 (2010). Professor Romero is the Maureen B. Cavanaugh Distinguished Faculty
Scholar and Professor of Law at Penn State's Dickinson School of Law.
26. Id. at 312.
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Professor Susan Stabile considers analogous questions in the context
of abortion policy,"7 where the Catholic commitment to the sanctity of life
from conception to natural death confronts not only deep disagreement in a
pluralistic society, but barriers erected by the Supreme Court in the form of
constitutionalized rights to abortion. In exploring how an approach to abortion might be both faithfully Catholic and capable of realization under the
conditions likely to prevail in America for some time, Professor Stabile
analyzes a number of questions, such as whether Catholics can pursue strategies that aim to persuade people of abortion's immorality and encourage
alternatives but not criminalize it. At various points, her analysis follows
the moral theology categories of formal (or intentional) cooperation with
evil (forbidden) and material cooperation (unintended assistance, which
may be permitted for proportionate reasons).2S These categories themselves,
one should note, are central components of the Catholic variety of "Christian realism," for as Professor Stabile notes, they "address the reality that it
is impossible to avoid evil completely" and they aim "to help Catholics
discern how to limit their involvement in evil"29 even as they pursue other
goods. Ultimately, Professor Stabile finds some key questions difficult to
answer-and, like Professor Romero, raises the possibility that a Christian's prime duty is to be prophetic rather than realistic-but concludes that
"the goal of finding common ground" that might incrementally move society toward greater respect for unborn life "is important enough to justify
seeing what a Catholic realist perspective might add."30
Finally, Professor Richard Esenherg, explores, in the context of current
debates over government regulation, "how Christian Realism might be informed by-and how it might inform-the Catholic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity."31 Two themes run through Professor Esenberg's
article, which criticizes the recent large-scale federal interventions in the
economy through the economic-stimulus and health-care bills. One theme is
that althongh the Catholic concepts of solidarity and subsidiarity may seem
in tension-the first making the common good a priority, the second setting
a presumption against centralized efforts to promote that good-they can
actually be resolved if the preference for subsidiary (smaller) institutions is
seen not just as a means of preventing abuse by centralized power, but as an
27. Susan J. Stabile, An Effort to Articulate a Catholic Realist Approach to Abortion, 7 U.
ST. THOMAS. LJ. 340 (2010). Professor Stabile is the Robert and Marion Short Distinguished
Chair in Law and Professor at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.
28. Id. at 346-47; see, e.g., id. at 356-59, 364-68 (applying such categories to reason that a
faithful Catholic may support laws that restrict abortion but do not ban it when that is all that is
possible, but may not support promoting access to contraceptives even if it will reduce abortions).
29. [d. at 346.
30. [d. at 368-69.
31. Richard M. Esenberg, Never Let a Good Crisis Lead You Astray: The Lessons of Christian Realism and Subsidiarity for Public Policy, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 370 (2010). Professor
Esenberg is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School.
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intrinsic value in itself, empowering individuals and small groups more directly "to participate in the definition and advancement of the common
good.'032 Second, while realism does not counsel despair or subordinate
moral claims to the logic of market economics, it does call for hard-headed
recognition of facts: for example, "that centralized decision-making inevitably suffers from the inability of one decision maker to have enough knowledge to make superior decisions."33

3.
This issue's articles cover a wide set of topics from judicial power and
constitutional interpretation to immigration, abortion, financial, and healthcare policy. Each topic raises its own distinct questions. Even more, the two
sets of articles differ in category. In constitutional decision making, as Professor Powell emphasizes, officials act under the constraint of a textual authority, taking their justifications from the concepts or values embodied in
the text rather than their "substantive views on what is wisest or best to
do."" By contrast, the papers on Christian realism and various topics do
make arguments of policy and principle: what are the wisest or best actions,
whose enactment our legal stmctures permit but do not compel.
Still, the articles have a point of contact. It is general but important: the
idea that law and policy must strike a proper balance between empowering
human beings to realize their possibilities and controlling for their persistent tendency to impose on others or ignore others' interests and perspectives. Professor Powell ultimately defends the tradition of common-law
constitutional reasoning because il gives judges enough room to pursue and
exposit constitutional ideals~reflecting confidence that they can do so
responsibly~while also constraining them, as much as fallen humans can
be constrained, by the norms of the lawyer's craft. A Niebuhrian realist
approaching the judicial role might think this places too much confidence in
judges' self-restraint and the impartiality of their reasoning. But the
Niebuhrian would also have to give serious weight to Powell's arguments
that constitutional ideals can be meaningful and not just the imposition of
personal preferences, and that originalism is no panacea for judges' human
willfulness.
In any event, we can and should assess all these matters~from the
role of judges to the proper aims of policy~starting from an anthropology,
an account of human nature, that recognizes, in Pascal's words, both the
great dignity of human beings and the wretched state they are in. How to
weigh the two sides of that tension in each subject area is a matter for
subject-specific argument. But to set forth the tension is among the main
32. [d. at 383.
33. [d. at 392.
34. Powell, supra note 7, at 292.
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contributions of religious thought to law and public policy: a fitting theme
for the Law Journal's motto of "faith anel justice" and the law school's
mission of "integrating faith and reason in the search for truth through a
focus on morality and social justice."35

35. University of St. Thomas Lmv Journal - Fides et lustitia, http://www,stthomas,edu/lnw!
programs/jollmalldefauit.html (Jour/wI motto); University of St Thomas - School of Law, Our
Mission, http://www.stthomas.edu/law/about/mission/default.html (law school mission),
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